This study evaluates the assumption that lobbying at the EP level steadily increased after the Treaty of Lisbon, and also the expectation that there would be no variation in lobbying activity (measured by types of lobbyists) during this period. Research was conducted through the utilization of data from the European Transparency Register as scraped by Friedrich Lindenberg between 2012 and 2014. After categorizing more than 16,000 entries it was determined that the amount of lobbyists targeting the EU has steadily increased, and the primary lobbying group between the researched period was Business-though, there was a significant amount of variation between the types of lobbying groups, with NGOs coming in second. This is indicative of citizens becoming more involved in EU affairs as the deepening of integration and the expansion of supranational authority continues to affect ordinary Europeans.
Introduction
Several scholars have noted the absence of literature on EU lobbying, and the majority of research to date has focused on the role of interest groups lobbying the European Commission before 2009. After the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, researchers from several disciplines noted the likelihood of increased lobbying of the European Parliament (EP), observing a shift in competencies and the increased role of the Parliament in the EU's legislative process. Though, problems of transparency and access have hindered the comprehensive, longitudinal data needed to quantify the Treaty of Lisbon's true effects on lobbying the EP. 2 With regard to Brandsma (2013) 3 , Hauser (2011) 4 , and Cirone (2011) 5 , this paper seeks to explore the reasons why interest groups would be more likely to lobby the European Parliament after the Treaty of Lisbon, identify whether an increase has actually occurred, and then gauge which interest groups have chosen to lobby the EP. As the term lobbying is frequently used throughout this paper, it is important to clarify how it will be used within the framework of this study: Lobbying refers to the influencing of legislative or administrative decisions made by public officials through the use of interest group representatives. 6 Section 2 will provide a historical overview of the changing structure of the European Parliament in order to provide a contextual background necessary in understanding the reasons behind the EP's post-Lisbon makeup. Section 3 will critically review the theories of the aforementioned scholars in determining the potential reasons why an interest group would be more likely to 2 Henry Hauser, "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon," in Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 29, 2011, 697 3 Gijs Jan Brandsma, "Bending The Rules: Arrangements for Sharing Technical and Political Information between the EU Institutions," in European Integration online Papers (EloP), vol. 17 (Special Issue 1), 4 Ibid.
5 Alexandra Cirone, "Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU," Columbia University, 2011, 6 Peter Koeppl, The Acceptance, Relevance and Dominance of Lobbying in the EU Commission (London: Henry Stewart Publications, 2001) , in Hauser, 682 target the European Parliament when choosing which EU institution to lobby. The
Treaty of Lisbon has brought many changes to the EU's institutional structure, including an increased demand for access to technical information, causing MEPs to rely on lobbyist support. 7 On the lobbyist's side of the table, targeting the EP has been posited to be more efficient and cost-effective due to the use of party groups as information shortcuts. 8 The perceived benefits of targeting the EP contains a sense of dissonance when considering traditional views on EU lobbying. Past literature has noted the tendency for interest groups to target the European Commission in an attempt to shift EU policy, considering that the Commission is the only European institution with the right to initiate legislation. 9 Regardless, it is apparent that the EP has become a viable venue for lobbyists. 10 The EP is considered to be especially favorable for those representing NGOs and other groups that champion public interest issues-MEPs, as directly elected representatives of the European public, are very invested in topics of relevance to their constituents. 11 In considering the complex inter-institutional relationships of the European Union, technical information is not the only important type of knowledge required to navigate the legislative arena. Brandsma argues that both technical and political information are imperative and dictate the strategy institutions adopt in order to push legislation forward. 12 He even argues that political information is the subject of most, if not all, inter-institutional arrangements, which indicates that MEPs most rely on interest groups for their technical information. What is uncertain, however, is whether this reliance on lobbying truly affects the legislative process-the European Parliament is but one arm of the European Union's legislative body. Afterwards, the aforementioned data will be analyzed to determine a) whether there has indeed been an increase of individuals lobbying the European Parliament since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and b) which organizations have chosen to do so. 13 The remainder of the paper will re-visit the framework through which this study has been conducted in order to glean potential explanations for these changing trends within the EU. 12 Brandsma, 5 13 Previous data suggests that NGOs and other groups representing the public interest have chosen to target the European Parliament over the Commission, therefore this study will check whether this is still the case. See Cirone (2011 This attempt, however, appears to have been in vain. The difference in voter turnout between 2009 and 2014 was less than 1%, continuing the narrative of more power, less interest. 25 Despite these failed attempts at cultivating democratic legitimacy, the European Parliament has indeed made significant power gains since its creation, and is therefore likely to be more of a target for interest groups.
Theoretical Framework
The previous section establishes that the EP has achieved significant power gains since its creation, but how does this equate to an increase in being targeted by 23 Hauser 
Methods
Though there is currently a public register that displays those with accreditation to lobby the European Parliament, it lacks historical data and is mired by those also registered with the European Commission. In order to perform a cross- The initial study was designed to code the fifth data category as Think Tank, however it quickly became apparent that there were more research-oriented organizations that were not solely think tanks. NGO dropped from 45% growth to 13% growth in the first year, but slowly increased to 27% growth in the final sample; and Business, aside from the aforementioned jump, maintained an almost consistent growth rate to match that of the total number of registered lobbyists (in the months between the last two samples, the number of registered lobbyists representing businesses grew by 12.8%). Therefore, we may reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant variation in lobbying activity (measured by types of lobbyists)-there was significant variation, which may be the result of the deepening of integration in the EU.
It is unsurprising that Business was (and is likely to still be) the primary group lobbying Parliament. Even at its inception, economic integration across Member states has been more palatable than political integration. It is, however, notable that the rate at which business lobbied Parliament was barely affected by the global economic crisis and subsequent Great Recession. This is likely due to the theories laid out by Brandsma, Hauser, and their colleagues-large businesses have the capital to research topics of importance to themselves and MEPs (i.e. access to technical information); vis-à-vis perceived preference coherence, this research may be passed on to other MEPs with little to no added expense to businesses. These avenues may also be adopted by NGOs, especially considering that they represent public interests and are therefore integral to the European legislative process; nevertheless, NGOs lobby on a smaller scale than businesses.
Limitations and Future Research
There were several limitations to this study, the first being that the data used did not cover the period immediately after the Treaty of Lisbon. Though my results do suggest that H1 is correct and H0 is incorrect, the data would be more robust if it covered interest groups with EP passes in six month intervals beginning in 2010 and ending more recently, ideally in 2016.
Additionally, though the way in which Business was classified generally followed suit with Cirone's methodological set up and the classifications used by LobbyFacts and OpenInterests, it is ideologically questionable and may have skewed the data. This is due to this study's inclusion of interest groups representing trade unions. Trade unions should not have been included in the Business category because they aren't inherently representing the interests of businesses-instead, they represent the rights and interests of their particular constituencies, namely, workers.
It would be valuable to replicate the previous study while isolating trade unions as a separate control variable to assess whether the results would still place Business as the primary group lobbying the EP.
Though this study's results do indicate that NGOs are taking advantage of the Parliament's increased powers, these NGOs are greatly outnumbered by Business interests; as the deepening of EU integration continues to affect ordinary citizens' lives, though, it will be pertinent to identify whether NGOs will ever surpass businesses in their future lobbying endeavors.
Conclusion
This study attempted to show the changing trends in lobbying within the European Union, with particular focus on interest groups that have chosen to lobby the European Parliament. By providing historical context, it was established that the EP has experienced a significant growth in power and responsibility over the last 64 years, and as the solely elected body of the EU, MEPs are tasked to represent the interests of their constituents. Afterwards, the theories of Brandsma, Hauser, Cirone, and their colleagues were discussed in order to lay the groundwork for this study's hypothesis and null hypothesis-through coding more than 16,000 data entries covering a period of two years, it was determined that the rate of lobbyists targeting the EP has indeed increased and indicates continual growth; it was also determined that there is a large amount of variation in the types of groups that choose to lobby the EP. Though businesses are the overall lobbying "champions" in terms of sheer numbers, it is logical to posit that the increasing number of NGOs involving themselves in EP lobbying is indicative of an ever-closer European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon, as an answer to the call for more citizen involvement, has been yet another step towards the idea of political union.
